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Executive summary: 
 
 
The basic point made by this paper is simple: Employers pay for employees’ ability as 
they get to know them better but don’t pay for it as much as they would in a fully 
transparent labour market. This study of wage inequality demonstrates that 
qualifications are noisy signals of individual skills and British employers rely less on 
them as indicators of productivity as they get to know their workers better. However, 
relatively able but less educated workers appear to find it very difficult to advertise 
their skills to other potential employers, giving a strong bargaining power to their 
incumbent employers.  
 
Qualification credentials are intended to certify that an individual has acquired a 
determined level of skills but they are also bound to reveal to employers a more 
general type of ability that has enabled individuals to learn and acquire a determined 
qualification. Therefore, qualifications may also possess a strong informational value 
independently of their educational content. Statistical discrimination in favour of more 
educated individuals may occur when in the absence of better information, more 
educated individuals are known to be on average more productive than less educated 
ones.  
 
However plausible this interpretation can be, there are no available estimates of the 
informational value of qualifications in Britain that can be used to guide policy 
makers. This research uses data from two British cohorts to look at the association 
between earnings, qualifications, cognitive ability and experience in the labour 
market. This data is particularly rich and provides a wealth of information about 
individual background and measures of cognitive development, based on a series of 
tests administered throughout childhood. These measures are reputed to be very good 
approximations to standard measures of IQ.  
 
This paper sets out to test two key hypotheses, based on a simple model of wage 
determination: 
 
(a) Do employers discriminate between workers according to their schooling, but 
tend to rely less on qualifications as they learn more about their workers’ 
ability? 
(b) Is there an “insider informational advantage” for incumbent employers? If this 
is the case, individuals trying to improve their career prospects by moving jobs 
but lacking proper credentials would find themselves undistinguishable from 
less able workers who have not been retained by their employers.  
 
Because the available data contains information on IQ, which is not easily measurable 
by employers, it is possible to identify the simultaneous phenomenon of statistical 
discrimination based on measures of schooling, and the increasing association 
between wages and measures of individual ability. Empirical investigation of these 
hypotheses comes up with the following results: 
 
· Individuals with higher ability experience faster wage growth as they 
accumulate experience. Ability is the individual characteristic that accounts 
for most of the wage growth experienced by workers.  
· For a given experience level, increased time spent on the same firm makes 
schooling less valuable. For workers in manual occupations, ability becoming 
more valuable with higher tenure supports private learning by incumbent 
employers as opposed to widespread learning.  
· As workers stay longer in the same firm, higher ability becomes a stronger 
indicator of the probability of receiving training. Firms thus appear to (a) 
screen workers in order to maximise their own net benefits of training; and (b) 
provide learning when they know that workers have a lot to loose should they 
decide to quit and move to another firm. As it has been mentioned, this loss is 
particularly strong for blue-collar workers.  
 
The implication for government policy is clear. Less educated individuals who are 
more likely to focus on blue-collar occupations or choose a vocational route after 
leaving school do need a reliable system of credentials that can genuinely reflect 
excellence at the skills learned as well as proof of the capacity to learn more specific 
skills on the job. Even though there may be efficiency reasons to rely on firms to 
provide the full extent of vocational learning, over-reliance on them without 
addressing the problem of insider informational advantage will surely lead to 
increased bargaining power for employers with all benefits from learning accruing to 
the latter.  
 
On a more general level, this research makes a strong case for simulating the impact 
of the introduction of new qualifications on a new dimension related to the way 
employers set their expectations about the ability of individuals with both old and new 
qualifications. Stigma effects can unexpectedly wipe out the informational value 
associated with certain credentials, with considerable loss to learners, employers and 
the wider society that subsidised such reforms.   
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1 Introduction
We frequently observe how decisions must be made with very limited information. When facing
this type of situation, expectations will be based on any relevant information available.1 This
applies to a very wide range of decisions such as whether to buy a second-hand car, delegate a task
to someone, hire a new employee or even decide whether to get married. All these situations have
in common a degree of uncertainty about the outcome and the other party involved (who may
not always share the exact same objectives) having valuable information. It is no coincidence,
judging from these examples, that much value is given to early signals or indicators.2 Similarly,
learning plays a major role on the way these ﬁrst impressions lead to more sound judgements.
Statistical discrimination and learning often come hand in hand. In the absence of accurate
information, people discriminate on the basis of characteristics that are statistically associated to
what may be an important element of a decision, even if there is little direct causal relationship.3
This statistical association is often based on the optimal behaviour of the parties involved.4 In
the classical article by Spence (1973), higher ability individuals can signal themselves as such by
incurring investments (such as education) which are less costly for them than for lower ability
individuals. Learning about some or all the relevant characteristics will lead to less reliance on
early signals.
In the context of an employer learning about a worker’s productivity, schooling appears to be
a potential source of information, independently of its strict value as human capital. Individuals
are often trusted with complex tasks on the basis of their certiﬁed, yet unproven, skills. As
workers accumulate experience, employers may learn that the individual with a university degree
may not be as productive as initially expected or that the worker who dropped out from school
is highly motivated and productive. In this situation, we should expect some type of response
on the ﬁrm’s side.5 Employer learning can take place in a number of diﬀerent possible ways,
ranging from the early stages in which CVs and previous employer’s references are required, to
personal interviews and in some cases even aptitude and psychometric testing. Learning would
then proceed by means of work monitoring, etc.
Testing the existence of learning, signals and statistical discrimination in the labour market
is important for many reasons. Educational policies and labour reforms might need to be eval-
uated within a context in which statistical discrimination and employer learning considerations
are present. It is widely acknowledged that a labour market with these characteristics will not
resemble the standard text-book competitive model which is used to foresee the impact of numer-
ous policies. The basic motivation for this paper is to provide a sense of how such assumptions
1Moreover, in many circumstances substantial costs will be incurred in order to gain additional information
and thus make a more accurate judgement.
2For example, the mileage of a car, technical reports, good-looks, etc.
3For example, discriminating against a job interviewee who is not wearing a suit.
4For example, producers of better quality goods can aﬀord to distinguish themselves from lower quality pro-
ducers by oﬀering a longer-serving guarantee on the good sold.
5The obvious variable one would be interested in is wages, although other decisions such as training provision
are likely to depend on results of the learning process.
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can lead to misleading conclusions.
The idea of linking experience to measures of skill is not new in the literature that studies
the presence of informational asymmetry in the labour market.6 My analysis builds on previous
work by Farber and Gibbons (1996) and Altonji and Pierret (1996,2001). They provide an
identiﬁcation strategy to test the employer learning hypothesis. If the econometrician has access
to a variable “z” that is associated with an individual’s productivity, but is not perfectly observed
by the employer, it is possible to infer directly a learning process by observing increasing returns
to this variable with experience.
Farber and Gibbons (1996) state three hypotheses following their employer learning/wage
determination model: In a competitive labour market where learning occurs at the same rate for
all employers. Employer learning does not imply that the coeﬃcient on schooling changes with
experience. The part of “z” which is orthogonal to the ﬁrm’s information set at the beginning
of the worker’s career will have an increasingly larger association with wages as time passes.
Wage growth will be a martingale process in the case of constant productivity, because wage
changes will be strictly driven by learning of previously ignored productivity features. Farber
and Gibbons’s empirical analysis using residualised AFQT as the proxy for the part of “z”
orthogonal to the ﬁrm’s information set conﬁrms two of these three hypotheses. The martingale
proposition is rejected in favour of a more parsimonious model of human capital accumulation.
Altonji and Pierret (1996, 2001) analyse a similar model which allows to use log-wages as the
dependent variable instead of wage levels. Their model allows them to simultaneously investigate
the phenomenon of employer learning and statistical discrimination on education. It implies that
the estimated coeﬃcient on the interaction of (non-residualised) ability with experience will be
positive, as in Farber and Gibbons (1996). But as learning takes place, the (positive) estimated
returns to schooling should decrease because education will be given less credit as a discriminating
variable. This hypothesis is conﬁrmed using the same NLSY data used by Farber and Gibbons.
The paper by Bauer and Haisken-DeNew (2001) is, to my knowledge, the only one that has
tried to estimate this type of employer learning model outside the US. The problem with their
analysis is the lack of a fully satisfactory “z” variable in the German Socioeconomic Panel, which
they use for estimation purposes. They look instead at parental education as a proxy for this
variable. In fact, they ﬁnd little evidence of employer learning in Germany. They also study
the hypothesis that incumbent employers may have better information about a worker’s ability
and informally state that asymmetric learning could be inferred from the tenure wage proﬁles,
as opposed to the standard experience interactions.
However, they provide no theory or model backing this type of implication. Under asymmetric
learning, the wage determination process is not as straightforward as argued in Farber and
Gibbons (1996) or Altonji and Pierret (1996, 2001). Indeed, a ﬁrm with private information
6Layard and Psacharopoulos (1974) and Psacharopoulos (1979) argue that under the signalling model, the
estimated eﬀect of schooling on wages should fall as labour market experience grows, following the above reasoning.
This proposition, as stated by Riley (1979), does not account for the fact that a signalling equilibrium requires
employers to have an unbiased expectation of the worker’s ability.
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on a worker will rarely pay the expected marginal productivity as the competitive pressures
from other potential employers are diminished by their lack of information. The incumbent
ﬁrm will trade oﬀ potential beneﬁts of lower wages with the probability that the worker might
leave. This type of model has been ﬁrst analysed very recently by Scho¨nberg (2002), who
discriminates between empirical predictions associated with the symmetric and the asymmetric
learning models. Estimates also based on NLSY data appear to be supportive of asymmetric
learning only amongst university graduates.
In this paper I provide new evidence on employer learning in Britain. I look at both symmetric
and asymmetric learning. In order to provide some structure supporting the estimation analysis, I
have set up a simple model of asymmetric learning which embeds the simpler symmetric learning
model. The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reformulates the standard symmetric
learning model, discusses its implications and derives the asymmetric learning model along with
its empirical predictions. Section 3 describes the British cohort data used in the empirical analysis
and discusses the estimation methods. This is followed by the key estimation results in section
4. Section 5 concludes.
2 Modelling and Testing Employer Learning
I will ﬁrst argue that the problem of employer learning can be easily described within the standard
framework of measurement error in estimation. The basic idea, explained to a larger detail and
formalised in the appendix, is that a good proxy to a characteristic that is imperfectly observed
by employers but is valued by them (such as ability) will be observed to have a larger impact
on earned wages as employers learn about their workers total skills. This learning process is
assumed to occur at an unspeciﬁed rate as experience levels increase. Conversely, the estimated
return to other observable characteristics that are known to be correlated with ability should
decrease over time as its informational value falls through learning of real ability.
Considering a linear ﬁrst order approximation to the eﬀect that experience has on the esti-
mated coeﬃcients through learning, the econometric speciﬁcation would be as follows:
wit = γ0 + µ0ti + α0si + α1tisi + β0zi + β1tizi + ζit, (1)
leading to testing the null H0 : β1 = α1 = 0 versus the alternative H1 : β1 > 0; γ1 < 0.
In a richer economic model, the employer learning hypothesis could easily be generated by
factors that have little to do with worker’s private information on ability and employer learning.
If employers train workers on the basis of their capacity to beneﬁt from it or, alternatively,
worker’s skills improve faster with experience the higher their initial level of human capital, the
hypotheses of non-decreasing returns and non-increasing returns to schooling would be expected.
The latter contradicts the basic employer learning model result, and could also be used for
identiﬁcation purposes too. However, it seems extreme to impose the assumption that skills
acquired through schooling do not help at all in the process of learning by doing.
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The employer learning hypothesis tends to be favoured, because returns to experience are
likely to be higher for more able workers and therefore overestimating β1. The likelihood of
rejection also increases because returns to experience are likely to be higher for more educated
workers, attenuating the expected negative sign of γ1.
Most existing models of employer learning, as above described, assume that information
about the productivity of workers is public, independently of how incomplete such information
can be. This implies that employer learning occurs at the same pace across incumbent and
competitor ﬁrms. This assumption is essential in order to preserve the implication that in a
competitive setting, workers will be paid their expected marginal product. It is easy to see that
if an incumbent employer privately realises that a worker’s skill is higher than initially expected,
wages should respond only up to a point where other potential employers are willing to bid for
his/her services. Because this signal is private, potential employers will not fully reward the
newly discovered skills and fail to compete with the incumbent employer to the eﬀect of driving
the wage closer to the fully perceived productivity.
Scho¨nberg (2002) has recently derived the ﬁrst explicit model that addresses the possibility of
asymmetric employer learning. She models a two-ﬁrm bidding game for a worker’s labour, where
the incumbent ﬁrm has acquired privileged information about ability after one period. Induced
separations are used to relate wage-tenure proﬁles to measures of ability in order to derive tests for
asymmetric learning. My model shares the approach of using taste shocks to cause exogenous
separations, but diﬀers from the previous one in that a competitive setting (as opposed to a
two-ﬁrm game) is used wherein outsider ﬁrms pay what they believe to be the real expected
productivity. A continuum of worker schooling and ability types is also allowed for. Empirical
predictions are shown to be very similar, with the only exception that identiﬁcation of asymmetric
learning from the data will only be possible when the distribution of non-pecuniary/taste shocks
is such that the worker’s probability of staying is suﬃciently elastic to the expected wage gap
between incumbent and outsider ﬁrms. If this is not the case, asymmetric learning might go
completely unnoticed.
2.1 A simple asymmetric learning model
Consider a very simple speciﬁcation for a worker’s skill level Σi, that I assume translates imme-
diately into productivity Σi = αsi + βai + ξi.
In this speciﬁcation, the skill level is a linear function of the individual amount of schooling si,
general ability ai and an unobserved idiosyncratic component ξi, which is assumed independent
of ability and schooling. Schooling and ability can certainly be related. For example, we can
allow ability to determine the amount of schooling attained. If we invert this relationship and
assume linearity again, we could specify general ability by ai = φsi + ρi, with ρi independent of
si. We can then substitute this back into the skill equation and get Σi = (α + βφ)si + βρi + ξi.
This speciﬁcation again indicates the standard problem involved in identifying α and β sepa-
rately. Learning in the asymmetric framework is assumed to take place as follows: Consider the
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case where ρi can be decomposed into three mutually independent terms and there are only two
time periods: ρi = v0i + v1i + v2i.
When a worker ﬁrst enters the labour market, all ﬁrms can learn immediately about the true
value of v0i. This might happen through the interview or hiring process, or it might simply follow
from education-related information about the quality of the years spent in education, which is
unobservable to the econometrician. After one period, all ﬁrms, incumbent and outsiders, can
learn about the value of v1i. However, the incumbent ﬁrm is assumed to realise the value of v2i
too. This ends up with the incumbent ﬁrm having a full knowledge about the worker’s skills
after one period. Extreme as this might sound, the only essential aspect is that after any period
of experience, the incumbent ﬁrm gets a better signal than its competitors.
For a completely inexperienced worker, the wage should be determined by the expectation of
skill conditional on the commonly realised values of si and v0i. Therefore, a worker’s wage in the
ﬁrst period should be determined as follows:7 w0 = E[Σ|x = 0, s, v0] = (α + βφ)s + βv0, where
x denotes experience.
In order to generate diﬀerent values of experience in the current ﬁrm (tenure), I model
separations using a very simple process. After one period, a worker receives an oﬀer wI1 from the
current (I =incumbent/insider) employer and expects to receive an oﬀer wO1 from any outsider
(O) ﬁrm. Bertrand-like complexities can be avoided by considering that every individual draws
a value θ from a known continuous distribution Γ. This represents the money value of a taste
shock relative to staying in the current ﬁrm.8 Hence, a worker will stay if and only if the wage
gap wI1−wO1 is higher than the money value of the taste shock θ, which for simplicity is assumed
to be distributed independently from all the other variables in the model.
Let us turn now to the determination of the optimal wage oﬀer by the incumbent employer.
Since incumbents obtain full information about the worker’s skill, they will try to maximise the
expected value of the wage oﬀer, which simply reduces to the product of the stay probability
times the diﬀerence between real productivity and the wage paid.
wI1 ∈ argmaxw(Σ− w)Γ(w − wO1 ).
In this setting, an incumbent employer takes its competitors’ wage oﬀers as given, and the
stay probability Pr[wI1 − wO1 ≥ θ] = Γ[w − wO1 ]. The ﬁrst order condition of this problem
determines that the expected marginal beneﬁt of a higher wage equates with the marginal cost.
(Σ− wI1)Γ′[wI1 − wO1 ] = Γ[wI1 − wO1 ].
The marginal beneﬁt is stated in terms of the additional staying probability when the wage
oﬀered is below the real productivity level, whereas the marginal cost follows from the fact of
having to pay a higher wage to keep the worker. Dividing both sides by (wI1 − wO1 ) a rather
7To simplify the notation, I will omit the individual index i from now onwards.
8This can refer, for example, to personality problems with colleagues or superiors or alternatively, the fact that
the individual’s partner has found a job in a diﬀerent city.
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intuitive relationship can be found.
	[wI1 − wO1 ] ≡
Γ′[wI1 − wO1 ]
Γ[wI1 − wO1 ]/(wI1 − wO1 )
=
wI1 − wO1
Σ− wI1
,
which simply indicates that the staying probability elasticity of the wage oﬀer gap (the term on
the left hand side of the equation) must equal the ratio between the wage gap and the incumbent
ﬁrm’s surplus.9 This implies the wage oﬀer:
wI1 = w
O
1
1
1 + 	[wI1 − wO1 ]
+ Σ
	[wI1 − wO1 ]
1 + 	[wI1 − wO1 ]
≈ wO1
1
1 + 	¯
+Σ
	¯
1 + 	¯
.
This shows that the incumbent ﬁrm’s wage oﬀer is a weighted average of actual productivity
and the competitors’ oﬀer, where the weight given to actual productivity is positively associated
with the responsiveness of the staying decision to the wage gap between incumbent and outsiders.
The determination of the optimal wage oﬀer made by outsiders is the last element that needs
to be considered. Particular attention needs to be paid to the formation of expectations about
the skill of a worker observed moving between ﬁrms. Firms which make a wage oﬀer and end
up hiring an individual, need to realise that their oﬀer has been preferred to that made by other
competitors, including the incumbent ﬁrm. Winning in this competition is somehow bad news
as the chosen worker may be expected to be of lower ability than someone separated from a ﬁrm
for purely random reasons. In this quasi-competitive setting, the outsider’s oﬀer will satisfy:
wO1 = Eθ,u2 [Σ|s, v0, v1, wI1 − wO1 ≥ θ].
Using the result from the incumbent ﬁrm wage setting decision this can be rewritten as
follows:
vO2 = Eθ,u2 [Σ|s, v0, v1, wI1 − wO1 ≥ θ] = Eθ
{
Ev2
[
v2|v2 ≤ 1 + 	¯
	¯
θ
β
+ vO2 |θ
]}
. (2)
Under some regularity conditions on the distributions of θ (Γ) and v2 it is possible to ﬁnd a
solution vO2 to equation (2).
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This simply states that the equilibrium reward vO2 for the unknown ability component v2 must
be equal to the expected value of this variable conditional on being smaller than the equilibrium
reward plus the correction term ∆ = (1+ 	¯)θ˜/(	¯β). The existence of a solution requires that the
correction term is positive, which basically means that the nature of the taste shock must involve
9For simplicity, I will assume that the elasticity  does not depend on the wage gap (wI1 −wO1 ). This will allow
considerable simpliﬁcations as a ﬁrst order approximation, it may not be so unreasonable to treat the gap eﬀect
on the elasticity as negligible compared to other eﬀects.
10For illustrative purposes, it is helpful to think of a value θ˜ for which the following approximation is valid:
vO2 = Ev2
[
v2|v2 ≤ 1+¯¯ θ˜β + vO2
]
. This value will rarely coincide with the mean value of θ because the conditional
mean is unlikely to be a linear function. For example, under normality, this function will be concave and higher
order moments would be required to improve the approximation.
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on average a negative pre-disposition to stay.11 This allows outsider ﬁrms to believe rationally
that workers who end up leaving their jobs to join them are not necessarily less able workers who
received very low oﬀers from their incumbent employers.
2.2 Predictions of the asymmetric learning model
The asymmetric learning model presented above suggests a diﬀerentiated wage pattern for in-
experienced workers, experienced workers who quit their original employment, and experienced
workers with a higher tenure level. In a two-period model such as this, there are only three
possible combinations of experience and tenure, although richer combinations could be derived
from a longer horizon model with additional learning components. Wages would be given by:
w0 = (α + βφ)s + βv0 (3)
wO1 = (α + βφ)s + β(v0 + v1) + βv
O
2 (4)
wI1 = (α + βφ)s + β(v0 + u1) + β
	¯
1 + 	¯
v2 + β
1
1 + 	¯
vO2 (5)
In these speciﬁcations, only schooling is observable to the econometrician. If a measurement
of ability z is available, measurement problems would still make it impossible to identify the pa-
rameters although inference about the features of the discrimination and learning model become
possible. Linear projections of wages for each separate group on schooling and measured ability
would produce the following coeﬃcients on ability:12
The OLS projections on ability and education would give precise estimates that can be
speciﬁed in a compact way. For a given experience level x and tenure τ , the projection on ability
would be:13
µz(x, τ) =
βCov(z, v0)
V ar(z − πs) + x ·
βCov(z, v1)
V ar(z − πs) + τ ·
	¯
1 + 	¯
· βCov(z, v2)
V ar(z − πs) ≡ β0 + β1x + β2τ,
and estimates for the learning/discrimination model follow from the estimation of:
wit = γ0t + γ1txit + γ2tτit + α0tsi + α1xitsi + α2τitsi + β0tzi + β1zixit + β2τitzi + ξit. (6)
This equation reﬂects the predictions made by the asymmetric employer learning model.
OLS projections on the experience, tenure, ability and education variables (xit, τit, zi, si), and
the pertinent interactions generalise the predictions of the two period model to a wider setting. It
is obvious that with a longer period model, the number of possible experience/tenure paths grows
11Higher order moments in the distribution of θ should meet additional requirements, such as limits on the
dimension of the variance, etc. Without imposing additional assumptions on the distributions, it is not possible
to guarantee the existence of a unique equilibrium wage oﬀer either.
12These would follow from: E∗[w0|s, z] = µs0s+µz0z, E∗[wO1 |s, z] = µOs1s+µOz1z and E∗[wI1 |s, z] = µIs1s+µIz1z,
where E∗[y|s, z] denotes the linear projection of y on s and z.
13Something similar can be written for the projection on schooling, that would be expressed as: µs(x, τ) =
α + βφ − π
(
βCov(z,v0)
V ar(z−πs) + x · βCov(z,v1)V ar(z−πs) + τ · ¯1+¯ · βCov(z,v2)V ar(z−πs)
)
≡ α0 + α1x + α2τ . Time subscripts are omitted for
presentational simplicity.
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and complicates the theoretical interpretation of the coeﬃcients.14 Linear interactions should
then be considered as a ﬁrst order approximation to diﬀerences between experience levels, and
also within, by diﬀerent tenure magnitudes. Conditional on experience and its interactions,
the tenure interaction with ability indicates the extent of additional learning by the incumbent
captured by the stayer’s equation that displays the correlation between the private signal v2 and
the ability variable. The key issue here is that the term 	¯/(1 + 	¯) should be positive, otherwise
retention of workers is not very sensitive to wage diﬀerences and employers do not need to match
potential outside oﬀers when 	¯ = 0.
Thus, by introducing interactions in the model it is possible to capture the diﬀerent com-
ponents of learning. As said, asymmetric learning can be inferred from the tenure interaction
provided 	¯ is positive, otherwise a positive covariance between the private signal and ability
would go unnoticed.
3 Data and Estimation Methods
The limited research up to date on employer learning, particularly in Europe, can be well ex-
plained by the lack of adequate data, namely, a measure of ability which employers cannot
observe. The National Child Development Study (NCDS) and British Cohort Study (BCS) are
continuing longitudinal studies of two birth cohorts born in Britain between 3 and 9 March 1958
and 7 and 11 April 1970, respectively.15 The richness of the information held about each cohort
member makes this one of the few appropriate data sources for testing employer learning and
statistical discrimination in the UK. Children interviewed at the ages of 10 and 11 were subject
to a series of tests aiming to measure diﬀerent elements of ability and numeracy and literacy
skills. These test scores have proven to be good predictors of further educational qualiﬁcation
attainment, appear to have a direct eﬀect on explaining wages independently of qualiﬁcations,
and therefore can be considered as approximate measurements of an individual’s ability.16
The ability measure used in this paper follows partially the methodology used in Cawley
et al (1996,1998,2001). Test scores obtained at the age of 11 in the NCDS and the age of 10
for BCS constitute the basis for the analysis because of the proximity in terms of age across
cohorts.17 Because the tests administered in each case were not identical, even though NCDS
and BCS cohort members were both measured in terms of their maths and reading ability, it is
not possible to use a raw test score in the analysis. This problem is circumvented by calculating
14A larger number of periods imposes on the theoretical model the calculation of more equilibrium expectations
of ability for movers, and additional assumptions are required about history-dependence, etc.
15For a detailed description of these studies, see the Centre for Longitudinal Studies website:
http://www.cls.ioe.ac.uk/cohort/cstudies.html.
16This does not imply that such measured ability is innate, as it has been repeatedly shown that attainment
progression (transitions in the score distributions) through childhood is very much inﬂuenced by parental and
environmental characteristics.
17NCDS test scores at the age of 11 were (i)reading, (ii)maths ability, (iii)non verbal general ability, (iv) verbal
general ability and (v)copying designs. BCS test scores at 10 include (i)maths, (ii) reading and (iii) British Ability
Scale test of general ability.
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the ﬁrst principal component for each cohort from the set of available tests.18 In the psychometric
literature, this measure has been frequently associated with the construct “g”, described as the
underlying general ability or intelligence factor. In a series of papers using the NLSY data, Cawley
et al (1996,1998,2001) ﬁnd that the coeﬃcient on “g” in the log wage regression is positive and
statistically signiﬁcant in all cases. They note that measured “g” has similar properties to the
commonly used US military’s Armed Forces Qualiﬁcation Test (AFQT), which is derived from
four ASVAB tests. AFQT is the measure used by Farber and Gibbons (1996) (in its residualised
version) and Altonji and Pierret (1996,2001) in their analysis of employer learning.
Regardless of what is the best way to measure general intelligence, the main reason for
using “g” is to enable the conversion of a set of ability variables into a single, continuous,
cross-cohort-comparable variable. Using a single ability variable also allows simpliﬁcation of the
interpretation of the ability/experience and ability/tenure wage proﬁles. Accordingly, the ability
measure should be considered as representing an individual’s relative position in her own cohort’s
ability distribution.19
The measurement of “g” used in this paper is undoubtedly more likely to serve its purpose
as a proxy for ability that cannot be fully observed by employers than variables such as parental
education, as used in Bauer and Haisken-DeNew (2001). From now onwards, I will refer to it as
either “g” or “z”.
Labour market data from the NCDS was obtained in 1981 (age 23), 1991 (age 33) and
1999/2000 (age 41/42), whereas for BCS, adult data was collected in 1991 (age 21), 1996 (age
26) and 1999/2000 (age 29/30).20
Experience and schooling variables have been derived from the reconciled work histories for
both cohorts. Schooling is considered as the number of years in full time education after the
sixteenth birthday.21 These magnitude, asides from recall problems, are accurate up to a month’s
scale. Although years of schooling may not be a good measure of an individual’s education in
a wage equation -given the alternative academic and vocational paths- the decision to focus on
years of education can be considered more in the context of a reduced-form model, in which
years of education is the ‘eﬀort input’, which leads to the attainment of a given qualiﬁcation.
It is important to emphasise at this point that it is not returns to education that the study is
18More details are available on request.
19There is also a strong comparative advantage of using a measure of “g” obtained at the same age for all
cohorts, relative to the AFQT measure in NLSY. The latter, by referring to diﬀerent age levels, is diﬀerentially
aﬀected by levels of schooling and parental inﬂuence that increase with age. Residualising with respect to age
may not be suﬃcient because parental socio-economic characteristics also shape movements in the distribution of
ability. For example, a low SES child with high ability score at an early age may not score as high at a later age.
Similarly, low scoring high SES children will be more likely to improve their position in the distribution.
20All surveys except BCS26 were conducted in the form of personal interviews, in which information was obtained
about family background, socio-economic conditions, health, education and many other characteristics. The BCS26
survey diﬀered from the rest in that a self-completion postal questionnaire was used as the survey instrument,
probably because of ﬁnancial constraints. Also ﬁnancial constraints have aﬀected the structure of each survey
inasmuch as these surveys depended on particular sources of funding which prioritised the quality of certain types
of information over other types. All surveys except BCS21 targeted the complete population of the study, in this
case, each birth cohort as detailed above. BCS21 focused instead on a representative subsample of individuals.
21The statutory school leaving age for both cohorts.
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trying to measure, but the education and ability-experience proﬁles. The existing literature has
focused until now on using years, even in Germany for the case of Bauer and Haisken-DeNew
(2001), where qualiﬁcations were converted to a year equivalent measure. Another reason for
using years is to improve the comparability between and within cohorts, where the responses to
qualiﬁcation attainment questions proved very sensitive to how the questions were phrased.
Table 1: Sample composition by age and year
year
age 1981 1991 1996 2000
21 371 (BCS)
23 3830 (NCDS)
26 1890 (BCS)
30 2941 (BCS)
33 2922 (NCDS)
42 2828 (NCDS)
NOTE: Number of valid observations available for estimation in each age*year cell, following from
NCDS and BCS70 adult data. Age and year groups are generically deﬁned, as not all men in each
survey were interviewed at the same time. In some cases there are several months of diﬀerence.
The sample used here is restricted to person-year observations of working men at the time of
being interviewed and have a valid wage observation, ability information from the age of 10/11
and complete work histories prior to the observation date. Table 1 shows the ﬁnal composition
of the sample by age and year.
The older cohort (i.e. NCDS), is illustrated by the lower diagonal of observations and clearly
indicates increasing drop-out ﬁgures. The younger cohort (i.e. BCS) corresponds to the upper
diagonal and the pattern is diﬀerent due to the reduced target sample in 1991 (which must be
added to the fact that some individuals had not yet ﬁnished their education) and the reduced
sample in BCS26 because of the low response to self-completion questionnaires.
This data description suggests that there are practical problems that need to be considered
before attempting to test the employer learning hypothesis. These involve the potential selectivity
of the data used, partly through diﬀerential attrition by age and year, and also the identiﬁcation
of learning separately from potential changes in the prices of skills. To deal with these issues, it
is also necessary to understand how the stylised two-period model could be set within a typical
estimation framework.
The symmetric learning model, in which all potential employers learn simultaneously about
workers’ ability can be speciﬁed econometrically as follows:
wit = γ0t + γ1txit + α0tsi + α1xitsi + β0tzi + β1zixit + ξit. (7)
This parallels equation (6) and is consistent with the predictions of the learning model when
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the private signal to the incumbent v2 is absent (v2 = 0).22 As noted, it is important to control
for the selective composition of the samples suitable for estimation. One possible approach is to
model the process that determines whether an individual enters the valid estimation sample in a
given year using background childhood and family data for the earlier sweeps. If this process is
adequately controlled for, it will be possible to obtain unbiased estimates of the earnings process
that are relevant for the learning model. In order to instrument participation, I include a wide
range of background variables which proved not to be signiﬁcant if included in the main wage
equation but proved signiﬁcant in their prediction of participation in the survey.23 The selection
model appears to perform satisfactorily, but the selection term turns out to be not statistically
signiﬁcant in either of the wage equations estimated in this chapter.
The second important issue that needs to be taken account of is the possibility that the way
in which the market values skills has changed over the time period under consideration. Failure
to control for this could mislead us into accepting the learning model when there has been an
aggregate increase in the returns to cognitive ability, possibly due to a higher demand for this
type of skill or changes in the overall supply.
The root of the problem is the need to combine the need of a suﬃcient degree of variation in
experience with the adequate controls for potential changes in returns over time. The fact that
only two birth cohorts are available and there are only three wage observations at most for every
individual certainly complicates the identiﬁcation strategy.
Variation in experience is achieved through the combination of having observations at diﬀerent
ages and within the same age groups, some individuals have been interviewed in diﬀerent months
and they diﬀer, conditional on a given level of schooling, in the amount of time they have been
unemployed or out of the labour force for reasons other than education. The latter source of
variation is not very helpful as it induces elements of endogeneity and that is the reason why the
emphasis is on the age variation. With a single cohort, employer learning would be confounded
with a potential increase in the returns to ability in the economy. Two cohorts are therefore the
minimum data requirement but separate identiﬁcation of time and learning eﬀects is not feasible
in a purely non-parametric approach.
My approach here is to allow for diﬀerent returns to ability and schooling in 1981 and 2000,
leaving the early and mid-nineties as the benchmark case. In practice, the only signiﬁcant
diﬀerences turn out to be driven by the comparison between the 1981 NCDS survey and the rest
(1991 and after), with a remarkable increase in the returns to both cognitive ability and years
of schooling afterwards. It is important to note that when introducing this type of control, the
hypothesis of employer learning may be rejected more often than it should, as it could lead to
ignoring the full extent of the learning process taking place between 1981 and 1991 in the NCDS.
22Another feature is that it allows for changes in the prices of skills (ability, education and experience (xit) over
time t). For simplicity, the interaction terms are not interacted with time.
23These include a quadratic in the ability index, parental class and education information and whether the
teacher had reported that the individual, as a child, used to lie at school. Controlling for ability, the assumption
of conditional independence required is more likely to be satisﬁed in practice than in a data set with more limited
information.
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Whereas the process of experience accumulation is more parsimonious (entirely deterministic
in a model without unemployment), the same is not true for tenure. The probability of staying
in the same ﬁrm is associated with the private signal the incumbent employer receives, and this
is correlated with overall ability, Prob[θ ≤ wI1 − wO1 ] = Γ[β 1+(v2 − vO2 )].
In a standard OLS regression of wages on tenure, this variable is thus likely to be endogenous
if the appropriate conditioning variables are not included and this will bias estimates. This is
not exactly the case here, as the variables that determine tenure accumulation are accounted for
through the ability variable. The idiosyncratic taste shock θ has been assumed independent of
productivity and its omission does therefore not aﬀect results.24 These crucially depend on the
quality of the ability measure used in the analysis.
4 Estimation Results
I have ﬁrst considered the symmetric employer learning model, as speciﬁed by equation 7. In
terms of the extended model, this corresponds to the case with the distribution of v2 degenerate
at its mean value zero.25 Under the assumption that the ability variable z is correlated with
v1, conclusions can be drawn from the experience proﬁles arising from the estimated returns to
ability and schooling by examining the coeﬃcients β1 and α1.
Table 2: OLS estimates from the symmetric learning model
I II III
Coef SE Coef SE Coef SE
Schooling 0.0672 0.0029 0.0656 0.0054 0.0456 0.0060
Cognitive ability 0.1189 0.0056 0.0812 0.0131 0.0533 0.0125
Experience 0.0612 0.0034 0.0571 0.0038 0.0479 0.0051
ExperienceSq/100 -0.1200 0.0101 -0.1089 0.0107 -0.0931 0.0144
Schooling*Exp/10 0.0025 0.0044 0.0058 0.0046
Ability*Exp/10 0.0256 0.0081 0.0179 0.0077
Mills ratio 0.0025 0.0211
Training 0.0748 0.0069
R-squared 0.3216 0.3225 0.3875
NOTE: Pooled OLS estimates, with standard errors robust to within-individual correlation. Dependent variable:
Log gross real hourly wage. (Prices=Jan 2001). All speciﬁcations include controls for diﬀerent returns to ability
and schooling in 1981 and year dummies. Speciﬁcation III also includes industry, occupation, ﬁrm size and
marital status dummy variables. The Mills ratio refers to the derived variable
φ(λjei)
Φ(λjei)
, where Φ(λjei) denotes the
probability of a cohort member being interviewed in sweep τ , φ the associated normal density and ei is a vector
of background characteristics used to estimate this process.
Table 2 contextualises estimates from the learning model with a typical human capital regres-
24Although z is a proxy for real ability, it is important to note that the predictions of the model are based on
the actual OLS projections. Hence, the validity of interacting ability and education with tenure hinges on the
adequacy of the theoretical model to reproduce the data generating process for tenure.
25If employer learning takes place, the distribution of v1 (i.e. the ability information not available at the
beginning of an individual’s career but further revealed to all ﬁrms) is not degenerate.
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sion which includes years of schooling and experience, as shown in speciﬁcation I, plus a measure
of cognitive ability. Estimates in speciﬁcation II suggest that much of the cognitive ability ef-
fect is associated with experience in the labour market. The schooling*experience interaction is
positive, although not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero.26 This result proves to be robust to the
inclusion of additional explanatory variables, including the sample selection correction, which
does not appear to have any impact on the estimated wage process.27 Overall, the symmet-
ric employer learning model hypothesis on the ability term is accepted (increasing returns to g
with experience), although the estimates do not fully conﬁrm the accompanying hypothesis of a
negative coeﬃcient on the schooling-experience interaction. There seem to be signs of employer
learning within a marginally richer model of human capital accumulation.
The next step is to understand better the nature of this learning process. The model states
that without private signals to incumbent employers, α2 = β2 = 0 in equation 6. This is so
because there is no private realisation of the v2 ability signal and all further realisations are of
the v1 type, i.e. common to all employers. However, under asymmetric learning, α ≤ 0 and
β2 ≥ 0.28
Table 3: OLS estimates from the asymmetric learning model
I II III
Coef SE Coef SE Coef SE
Schooling 0.0666 0.0029 0.0661 0.0054 0.0461 0.0060
Cognitive ability 0.1177 0.0056 0.0800 0.0131 0.0525 0.0125
Experience 0.0554 0.0035 0.0498 0.0039 0.0435 0.0052
ExperienceSq/100 -0.1090 0.0107 -0.0961 0.0113 -0.0852 0.0149
Tenure 0.0116 0.0017 0.0156 0.0019 0.0097 0.0018
TenureSq/100 -0.0315 0.0081 -0.0387 0.0081 -0.0243 0.0077
Schooling*Exp/10 0.0148 0.0054 0.0165 0.0055
Ability*Exp/10 0.0246 0.0093 0.0216 0.0088
Schooling*Tenure/10 -0.0249 0.0054 -0.0211 0.0051
Ability*Tenure/10 0.0012 0.0088 -0.0073 0.0081
Mills ratio 0.0025 0.0211
Training 0.0718 0.0070
R-Squared 0.3256 0.3282 0.3901
NOTE: Same speciﬁcations as in table 2, apart from the tenure terms displayed.
Table 3 looks at the asymmetric learning hypothesis. Introducing interactions, the positive
26This pattern of increasing returns to ability with experience is also conﬁrmed by looking at the age proﬁles
for the estimated returns in each one of the available surveys. Returns to schooling appear to increase over age
but a much lower rate and for the NCDS cohort members over thirties it completely disappears. Results available
on request.
27I also considered a more general speciﬁcation by interacting the selection correction term with year dummies.
This produced no signiﬁcant eﬀect for any of the estimates presented in the paper.
28The diﬀerences in the tenure proﬁles will be driven by the magnitude of the responsiveness of staying decisions
to the insider-outsider wage oﬀer gap. With a low responsiveness, incumbent ﬁrms do not need to reward workers
for skills that would not be valued (in expectations) by outsiders and learning does not translate into a stronger
relationship with the ability proxy z (“g”) used in this study. When the ‘staying’ elasticity to the oﬀer gap is high,
private learning can be more easily inferred from a diﬀerentiated tenure proﬁle.
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eﬀect of schooling and ability appears to increase signiﬁcantly with total labour market experi-
ence. Interestingly, the eﬀect of schooling falls strongly with tenure, as the asymmetric learning
model with high stay-response elasticity would suggest. Thus it looks as if conventional schooling
becomes a less important determinant of wages the longer an individual stays employed in the
same ﬁrm. The opposite result does not appear to follow from the ability/tenure interaction,
which is insigniﬁcant. One possible explanation is that private learning refers to a variable not
related to the cognitive ability index, such as motivation, capacity to work hard, etc.
One possible research avenue to understand better the employer learning process is to separate
workers according to their occupational classiﬁcation. Two groups have been made in this case:
white and blue collar workers. The estimates related to the symmetric learning model are
reproduced in table 4. Looking at the most basic speciﬁcation for white collar workers, both
implications from the employer learning model are satisﬁed: β1 > 0 and α1 < 0.29
Table 4: OLS estimates from the symmetric learning model: By occupation class
White collar workers Blue collar workers
I II III I II III
Schooling*Experience/10 -0.0142 -0.0191 -0.0140 0.0321 0.0143 0.0163
(0.0052) (0.0059) (0.0067) (0.0127) (0.0183) (0.0178)
Ability*Experience/10 0.0219 0.0107 0.0117 0.0078 0.0020 -0.0046
(0.0101) (0.0124) (0.0119) (0.0080) (0.0109) (0.0104)
Mills ratio 0.0008 0.0009
(0.0354) (0.0245)
Training 0.0843 0.0657
(0.0105) (0.0087)
R-Squared 0.3211 0.3228 0.3776 0.1752 0.1765 0.2596
Observations 7286 7286 7286 7476 7476 7476
NOTE: Pooled OLS estimates, with standard errors robust to within-individual correlation within parentheses.
Dependent variable: Log gross real hourly wage. (Prices=Jan 2001). Speciﬁcation I includes year dummies, ability
and a quadratic polynomial in schooling and experience. Speciﬁcation II also includes controls for diﬀerent returns
to ability, schooling and experience in 1981. Speciﬁcation III additionally incorporates industry, occupation, ﬁrm
size and marital status dummy variables.
With regard to blue collar workers, there seems to be little evidence about any type of
dependence of experience proﬁles on either ability or schooling.30 Comparing white and blue
collar estimates, it is also interesting to notice that the returns to schooling are decreasing for
white collar workers and increasing for blue collars. The magnitude of the returns to experience
is also considerable. White collar workers appear to have much steeper proﬁles. Additionally,
predictions based on individual characteristics seem to perform much better for white collars31,
29However, after controlling for possible diﬀerent returns to ability and schooling in 1981, the positive eﬀect of
experience on the returns to ability becomes statistically insigniﬁcant, although remains positive. It is important
to note that, given the limitations of the data, this type of control will tend to diminish the evidence supporting
employer learning. This could thus be considered as a lower bound on the estimated learning eﬀects.
30The only exception is the most basic speciﬁcation I.
31There is considerably less variation in terms of schooling amongst blue collar workers, many of which have no
reported spells of full time education after their 16th birthday.
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although job related characteristics have a higher explanatory power for the group of blue-collar
workers.
Table 5: OLS estimates from the asymmetric learning model: By occupation class
White collar workers Blue collar workers
I II III I II III
Schooling*Experience/10 -0.0050 -0.0099 -0.0054 0.0352 0.0186 0.0217
(0.0063) (0.0069) (0.0076) (0.0171) (0.0221) (0.0211)
Ability*Experience/10 0.0274 0.0160 0.0204 -0.0014 -0.0073 -0.0080
(0.0127) (0.0148) (0.0141) (0.0093) (0.0119) (0.0113)
Schooling*Tenure/10 -0.0177 -0.0169 -0.0145 -0.0099 -0.0113 -0.0142
(0.0060) (0.0060) (0.0058) (0.0172) (0.0172) (0.0160)
Ability*Tenure/10 -0.0117 -0.0105 -0.0154 0.0229 0.0234 0.0105
0.0144 0.0144 0.0137 0.0110 0.0110 0.0102
Mills ratio -0.0021 0.0012
0.0357 0.0245
Training 0.0852 0.0602
0.0106 0.0088
R-Squared 0.3232 0.3247 0.3792 0.1898 0.1910 0.2653
Observations 7236 7236 7236 7476 7476 7476
NOTE: Pooled OLS estimates, with standard errors robust to within-individual correlation within parentheses.
Dependent variable: Log gross real hourly wage. (Prices=Jan 2001). All speciﬁcations include level ability, a
quadratic polynomial in schooling, experience and tenure and year dummies. Speciﬁcation II incorporates controls
for diﬀerent returns to ability, schooling, experience and tenure in 1981. Speciﬁcation III also includes industry,
occupation, ﬁrm size and marital status dummy variables.
Turning now to the more general asymmetric learning model, there also seems to be a clearly
diﬀerentiated pattern between white and blue collar workers. After controlling for experience,
there is no evidence of a positive eﬀect of tenure on the estimated returns to ability, although
as argued before for the whole sample, the returns to schooling appear to fall with tenure. As
for blue collar workers, there is some indication of increasing returns to cognitive ability with
tenure for the speciﬁcations without job characteristics. The sign on the schooling interaction
is negative (although insigniﬁcant), as predicted by the asymmetric learning model. It is also
interesting to note that returns to tenure are almost twice those for white collar workers.
In conclusion, there seems to be some reason to support the learning hypothesis in its asym-
metric form amongst blue collar workers, although this learning may not so much refer to the
cognitive ability index used in this paper. It is more obvious to say that ﬁrms do initially discrimi-
nate on the basis of schooling amongst this group. The fact that the evidence supporting learning
for blue collar workers disappears once we control for ﬁrm characteristics raises new questions,
such as whether ﬁrms decide to train workers after they learn about them, and whether the type
of training received makes them less likely to move elsewhere because of largely untransferable
job-speciﬁc skills. This type of eﬀect would be unlikely to be reﬂected in wages and therefore
little inference could be made from the experience and tenure proﬁles.
I examine this hypothesis in table 6. The theoretical structure devised for wage determination
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may not directly translate into a similar set of training incentives for ﬁrms.32 I estimate the
reception of training as a function of the same characteristics used in the earnings regressions.
For the combined sample, there are positive (although decreasing) eﬀects of schooling, experience
and tenure on training incidence. Cognitive ability plays an important role too. The important
aspect here is the decreasing eﬀect of schooling on the incidence of training as tenure increases,
with the opposite eﬀect holding for the incidence of ability. When introducing additional controls,
the schooling interaction eﬀect loses importance, but it becomes clear that previously laid-oﬀ
workers are less likely to receive training.
Table 6: Firm-sponsored training in current job: Probit estimates
All White collar Blue collar
I II I II I II
Schooling*Experience/10 -0.0397 -0.0188 -0.0282 -0.0249 0.0933 0.0688
(0.0141) (0.0145) (0.0177) (0.0180) (0.0366) (0.0383)
Ability*Experience/10 0.0087 0.0060 -0.0451 -0.0494 0.0802 0.0585
(0.0232) (0.0239) (0.0359) (0.0362) (0.0337) (0.0350)
Schooling*Tenure/10 -0.0219 -0.0183 -0.0294 -0.0246 0.0135 0.0281
(0.0149) (0.0153) (0.0168) (0.0170) (0.0458) (0.0473)
Ability*Tenure/10 0.0533 0.0428 0.1147 0.1109 -0.0072 -0.0278
(0.0261) (0.0269) (0.0394) (0.0396) (0.0382) (0.0400)
Laid-oﬀ movers -0.0654 -0.0347 -0.0896
(0.0374) (0.0541) (0.0514)
Voluntary movers -0.0021 0.0843 -0.0914
(0.0286) (0.0399) (0.0411)
Log-likelihood -9848.66 -9054.97 -4772.49 -4658.07 -4821.92 -4290.76
Pseudo-R2 0.0351 0.1128 0.0437 0.0667 0.0285 0.1355
Observations 14762 14762 7286 7286 7476 7476
NOTE: Binary dep.var.=1 if individual received formal training in current job. Coeﬀs and rob.standard errors
reported. Voluntary movers:=report having left previous job to earn more or to get a better one. Laid-oﬀ movers:=
reported dismissal or laid oﬀ from their previous job or ﬁxed term expired, not renewed by employer. Ability,
schooling, experience and tenure square polynomials also included.
The learning eﬀect on the incidence of training amongst white collar workers is very strong,
judging from the opposite signs of the α2 and β2-equivalent coeﬃcients. In this case, voluntary
movers are also found to be more likely to receive training. For blue collar workers, α1 and β1
are both positive (experience interactions). The tenure proﬁles in this case do not reveal much,
but it is quite remarkable to see how being a “mover” reduces the chances of receiving training,
independently of the context (laid-oﬀ versus voluntary job changers). Although it is possible
that these results actually reﬂect some sort of inverse causation, a reasonable interpretation is
that employer learning is present in many parts of the labour market and that it operates in
many diﬀerent ways. The eﬀects on training indicate that it is not possible to ignore the process
of human capital accumulation, which will have very diﬀerent implications depending on the
speciﬁcity of the human capital. Asymmetric learning shows that even perfectly transferable
human capital may not be so because of the informational advantage that an incumbent ﬁrm
32Unfortunately it is not possible to distinguish between general and ﬁrm speciﬁc training.
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may have with respect to other potential employers.
5 Concluding Remarks
This paper has discussed the empirical implications of a model of asymmetric employer learning
about a worker’s real productivity. This framework encompasses existing models on symmetric
learning and also provides some foundations for existing informal tests of asymmetric learning.
Additionally, it has provided new evidence on the existence of labour market discrimination based
on schooling levels and on the process of employer learning about male workers’ ability in Britain.
This could also explain the increasing reliance by employers on personality questionnaires and
related forms of psychometric testing, as documented in Jenkins (2001).
Broadly speaking, there is support for the hypotheses of ability learning and schooling-related
discrimination particularly for white collar workers, although human capital accumulation in the
workplace seems to play an equally important role vis a` vis explaining the observed ability and
schooling experience-related wage proﬁles. Such process of skill accumulation can also be driven
by the existence of employer learning. Estimates of the probability of receiving training from the
employer coincide with this view.
With regard to the evidence on incumbent employers having privileged learning opportunities,
there seems to be some mild support for the hypothesis that this is the case for blue-collar,
less educated workers. Asymmetric learning for this group implies that employers will have
an even stronger monopsonistic power over their employees. This suggests that further eﬀorts
should be made to devise schemes of skill certiﬁcation for less educated British workers. A dual
apprenticeship scheme might be a feasible mechanism.
Throughout this paper, ability has been widely identiﬁed with the more speciﬁc concept of
cognitive ability. It is left for further research to investigate learning on the related concept of
social intelligence.33
Together, these results combined present a richer description of the British labour market
which substantially diﬀers from the standard view amongst many economists and policy mak-
ers. In order to prevent unintended distortions, educational reforms and interventions aimed at
improving the skill level of workers need to foresee their likely impact on the informational value
associated to qualiﬁcations. Changes in the informational content of signals in an economy will
have a wide range of repercussions on the human capital investment eﬀorts made by individuals
and on the way expectations are formed by employers about their employees’ real skills.
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A Appendix: Employer Learning and Measurement Error
Let us assume that employers pay workers according to their productivity Yi ≡ exp(yi), which I deﬁne as a very
simple function of a worker’s ability ai and years of education si.
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yit = γ + αsi + βait + κit + ξit.
This model assumes that education can have a positive eﬀect on productivity independently of ability ai by
allowing α to be positive. A pure signalling model of education would imply α = 0 and β > 0. At the other
extreme, a pure human capital model would be characterised by α > 0 and β = 0, although education attainment
could be partially determined by ability. To simplify the exposition, I will assume that ξi is independent of both
ai and si.
In this setting, it is also possible to allow an individual’s productivity to vary with experience t, representing
a skill improvement through learning by doing, etc. This process of skill improvement is modelled as homogeneous
and perfectly deterministic for all workers and perfectly observable by the ﬁrm: ait = µ + ait−1, where µ is a
constant. Let us denote ai0 as an individual’s ability at the beginning of her working career. ξ represents an
element of productivity which is observable by the ﬁrm but not by the econometrician. It may relate to the quality
of the machinery the worker will use. The variable κ represents worker characteristics which are unobservable to
both the ﬁrm and the econometrician at any moment of her career. Therefore it is impossible for a ﬁrm to infer
with complete certainty the correct value of a worker’s ability from past output realisations.
Assuming that all ﬁrms have identical knowledge about a worker’s productivity, competition determines that
the worker will be paid her expected productivity at each point of her career. Consider that Ωit is the information
set of a ﬁrm that employs worker i with experience t. Under the assumption of symmetric information across
ﬁrms, this information set will be common to all and the expectation of a worker’s overall productivity will be
identical, thus implying:
wit = γ + αsi + logE[exp(βait)|Ωit] + 1
2
σ2κ + ξit.
Expectations about a worker’s ability can be decomposed into a deterministic experience-related component
and a component relating to the expectation on the initial ability.
E[exp(ait)|Ωit] = E[exp(ai0 + µt)|Ωit] = exp(µt)E[exp(ai0|Ωit] =
= exp(µt + E[ai0|Ωit]) · E[exp(vit)|Ωit].
A ﬁrm’s expectations at time t about a worker’s original ability will be rational and zeit = E[ai0|Ωt], with the
initial ability decomposed as ai0 = E[ai0|Ωt] + vit. This implies that E[vit|Ωt] = 0 for all values of t. However, as
the information on a worker’s ability becomes more accurate through learning from past output realisations, the
variance of the expectation error will diminish, i.e. σ2vt > σ
2
vt+1 . Wage determination will then imply:
wit = γ +
1
2
σ2κ +
β2σ2vt
2
+ µβt + αsi + βz
e
it + ξit.
A crucial element of the identiﬁcation of the learning process is based on the relationship between Ωt and the
econometrician’s information set ΩEctt . It is strictly necessary that there is a part of the latter’s information set
not included in the employer’s information set. To formalise the learning process, imagine that the true initial
ability can be decomposed into a series of mutually independent additive components ai0 =
∑
J ςij . Consider
now that a ﬁrm’s initial knowledge of a worker’s ability is zei0 ≡ E[ai0|Ω0] =
∑
j∈Jf0
ςij . Learning implies that
more terms become revealed to the ﬁrm and the expectation becomes zeit ≡ E[ai0|Ωt] =
∑
j∈Jft
ςij . An empirically
derived proxy for ability could be represented as z =
∑
j∈Jec0 ςij . If all the members of J
ec
0 are contained in J
f
0 , it is
impossible to ﬁnd out anything about employer learning. Otherwise, with excluded components at an initial stage,
learning tells us that the correlation between E[ai0|Ωt] and zi will increase. Thus, the econometrician’s proxy for
expected ability becomes more accurate. This implies that the measurement error problem in the behavioural
relationship between log wages and schooling and expected ability is less important.
Because the bias persists, there is little hope that the marginal productivity of ability can be separately
identiﬁed from that of schooling. But this is not the aim of the exercise. Evidence of employer learning can
support the existence of a value in schooling other than human capital, which would play a substantial role in
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the information set Ωt. Even though this might be true in the absence of eﬀective employer learning, it is very
unlikely that employer learning takes place about a worker’s ability information he or she is completely unaware
of.34 The learning hypothesis suggests that measurement error will prevail but diminish as the worker becomes
more experienced. This leads to a range of hypothesis that can be tested. A prediction of the model is that
estimates of the eﬀect of expected ability should be less attenuated as experience increases. An interaction term
of zi with experience would identify this eﬀect given the previous assumptions. Thus, changes in the estimated
returns to ability and schooling will have the following probability limits.
plim(βˆt+1 − βˆt) = β
(
σ2ut−1
σ2ut−1 + σ
2
zet−1
(1− ρ2zet−1s)
− σ
2
ut
σ2ut + σ
2
zet
(1− ρ2zet s)
)
, (8)
plim(αˆt+1 − αˆt) = β
(
σzet
σ2s
σ2ut
σ2ut + σ
2
zet
(1− ρ2zet−1s)
−
σzet−1
σ2s
σ2ut−1
σ2ut−1 + σ
2
zet−1
(1− ρ2zet−1s)
)
. (9)
It is possible to show that the estimated coeﬃcient on ability zi will increase with experience. The measurement
error of real expected ability will decrease as explained above. Similarly, the variance of ﬁrm’s expected ability will
increase and its correlation with schooling will diminish, thus implying an unambiguous increase in the returns to
ability with experience.
As for the coeﬃcient on schooling, the opposite will hold. We should expect a reduction in the estimated
returns to schooling with experience. As the contractual relationship unfolds, the variance of vi will obviously go
down, and so will the variance of the error made by the econometrician when considering zi instead of z
e
i . The
coeﬃcient on zi will be less under-estimated and the coeﬃcient on years of education less over-estimated. Then, if
we consider the estimated coeﬃcients at diﬀerent stages T = 0 and T = 1, we will expect to ﬁnd that βˆo(1) > βˆo(0)
and αˆo(1) < αˆo(0).
34At least if we are willing to presume rational behaviour on her part. It is indeed possible that individuals have
a wrong understanding of what their true skills are.
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B Appendix: Not intended for publication
B.1 General details on data used
Following the completion of the latest surveys carried out in 1999/2000 in two of the main British
longitudinal cohort studies, NCDS and BCS70, for the ﬁrst time it is possible to undertake a full
comparison of these two cohorts in terms of their early progression into the labour market after
the legally established minimum school leaving age.
The National Child Development Survey, although originally devised as a Perinatal Mortality
Survey of the cohort born in Britain in the week 3-9 of March 1958, went on to record information
on the children and their families and school environments at the ages of 7, 11 and 16. Further
follow up studies were undertaken in 1981 (NCDS4), 1991 (NCDS5) and 1999/2000 (NCDS6).
Each survey contained retrospective questions on the individual’s previous track record of eco-
nomic activities, qualiﬁcations, earnings and many other aspects of her life.
The British Cohort Study of 1970 is a longitudinal cohort study of British children born
between 5 and 11 April 1970. The 1999/2000 questionnaire provides the most detailed available
source of information on these individuals as adults, although a survey based on a postal ques-
tionnaire was carried out in 1996 and a reduced sample was interviewed in 1992. The 1999/2000
questionnaire was structured identically to the sixth follow-up of the National Child Development
Survey (NCDS6), although referring to diﬀerent time periods in the respondents’ lives.
Childhood data in the 1970 cohort was obtained through the British Birth Study (1970), the
1975 Child Health and Education Studies (in 1975 and 1980). The Youthscan Study interviewed
cohort members at the age of 16 (i.e. 1986). Childhood data was collected from very diﬀerent
sources. Parents would be interviewed and asked to report on certain aspects of their child’s
behaviour as well as on related family and their own individual characteristics.
Producing work history data was probably the most complicated task. Substantial eﬀort was
devoted to creating a reconciled version of work history data, available from a very limited number
of surveys, which are subject to attrition, with data collected through radically diﬀerent methods
and with generally poor measures of the transition from school to the labour market. This work
involved lots of cross-validation exercises, comparing longitudinal reports and through the use of
fertility and education-related data. The reconciled data provides a record of an individual’s main
economic activity status in every month since her/his sixteenth birthday. Experience measures
were computed from this activity vector for each survey.35
With respect to the earnings data, I have used cleaned data cleaned by members of the
Institute of Fiscal Studies whenever possible. Gross hourly earnings deﬂated to prices as of
January 2001 have been converted to hourly wages using reported and checked usual working
hours. This applies for all follow-ups in the NCDS and the BCS at age 30. Wage data for the
BCS reduced sample at 21 was generated by following this same pattern. Only net earnings were
reported in the Postal Self-Completion Questionnaire administered to BCS cohort members in
35The guidance of Peter Dolton and Gerry Makepeace was essential for carrying out the construction of individual
work histories.
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1986. Given the secondary importance of this follow-up because its reduced response rates and
the lack of net data on earnings for most of the other surveys, I chose to convert such earnings
to gross amounts using the limited available information. Mario Fiorini, from IFS, provided me
with a code that simulated the tax system in 1986 and converted earnings from net to gross.
We invoked the assumption of revealed preference in choosing working hours to resolve the non-
monotonicity problem in inverting the theoretical relationship between gross earnings and tax
paid.
Other data on job characteristics was similarly deﬁned across surveys, although reports on
training received from employer are more diﬃcult to compare.
The indicator of behavioural adjustment is used as a proxy for non-cognitive abilities. It is
based on the Bristol Social Adjustment Guide (BSAG). Teachers were asked to indicate whether
sample children scored in a series of tests comprising various syndromes. These syndromes
refer to the child’s capacity to adjust to diﬀerent social environments and circumstances and
reﬂect aspects such as hostility and depression. The antisocial index follows from adding up the
number of items underlined by the teachers and then standardising the total score. Higher values
represent lower adaptability. NCDS cohort members were tested at age 11 and BCS children at
10.
The tests which have been used to derive measures of cognitive ability are as follows: For
NCDS at age 11, children were administered ﬁve tests, namely, (i) ‘General ability test’ (Douglas),
with verbal and non-verbal sections, (ii) ‘Reading comprehension test’ (NFER special), (iii)
‘Arithmetic and Maths test’ (NFER special), (iv) ‘Copying designs test’. Moving on to the BCS
children, they were assessed at age 10, when they were administered (i) ‘British ability tests’,
(ii) ‘Shortened Edinburgh reading test’ and (iii) ‘Youngs Maths test’.
The wage data collected in the surveys corresponds in all cases but one to gross wage earn-
ings.36 Unfortunately, in the BCS26 questionnaire individuals were asked about their net earn-
ings, which implies a strong comparability problem. This paper uses a tax simulation model
developed by Mario Fiorini (Institute of Fiscal Studies) that uses all available information in
the questionnaire to compute the expected tax paid by every individual and thereby retrieve the
original gross wage.37
Gross hourly wages are deﬂated to January 2001 prices. Table 7 shows average wages and
standard deviations for each age/year group. Average wages appear to grow with age/time for
each cohort and the same applies to the dispersion as measured by the standard deviation.
The right side of table 7 illustrates the problems underlying selective attrition in the data.
The cognitive ability index has zero mean and unit standard deviation in the sample where it
is computed. Adult observations included in the sample are more likely to have been drawn
from the upper part of the ability distribution. This is due to a number of factors. First, the
diﬀerentiated attrition pattern implies that more able individuals are more likely to remain part
36In many instances, individuals are also asked about their net wages.
37This tax simulation model imputes the married couples allowance to the male partner, given the lack of
information on the partners’ earnings that would allow to understand the couple’s optimal use of the allowance.
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Table 7: Log wages and cognitive ability in NCDS/BCS70
Log wages Cognitive ability: g
year year
age 1981 1991 1996 2000 1981 1991 1996 2000
21 1.8225 .0053
(.3833) (.8913)
23 1.7429 .0752
(.3502) (.9661)
26 1.9795 .2801
(.4689) (.9441)
30 2.1264 .1477
(.4756) (.9937)
33 2.2179 .1994
(.4329) (.9538)
42 2.3324 .1950
(.5142) (.9560)
NOTE: Average log real gross hourly wage and average cognitive ability index.
Standard deviation within parentheses.
of the study as they are interviewed as adults. Continuity is also important, as individuals
discontinuously interviewed will have longer spells of missing work history data and hence have
dropped-out of the sample used here. Second, higher ability tends to support participation in
the labour market and so the probability of obtaining a valid wage observation.
For NCDS, the sample seems to be not far initially from the whole population average nil
value for g, although successive follow-ups improve the ability composition, making the sample
less representative of the male population. In BCS, the smaller size sample at age 21 appears to
reproduce the ability characteristics of the cohort, but the very opposite conclusion follows from
the examination of BCS26. It seems in the last case that the use of a self-completion questionnaire
strongly discouraged less able individuals. At age 30, I obtain an ability composition comparable
to that at age 33 in the NCDS.
B.2 Principal components as a measure of g
This appendix brieﬂy describes the extraction of principal components to derive a comparable
index of cognitive ability for both cohorts. A ﬁrst principal component is deﬁned as the linear
combination g1 of the data matrix X, i.e. g1 = Xa1, such that it produces the best possible
overall ﬁt to the diﬀerent variables xk in X.
Assuming g1 known, a hypothetical regression of vector xk on g1 would produce an estimation
error ek = [I−g1(g′1g1)−1g′1]xk. Because a particular regression on a given variable is identical to
the inﬁnite number of variables which are proportional to this one, a normalisation is required.
Therefore it is imposed that g′1g1 = 1. This implies that ek = [I − g1g′1]xk and a measure of
the error made in approximating variable xk is given by the sum of squared errors e′kek. The
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Table 8: Summary statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Real gross hourly wage 8.879 5.656 0.520 99.911
Schooling (years) 1.560 2.086 0.000 7.750
Cognitive ability 0.162 0.965 -3.114 2.520
Experience (years) 12.356 6.702 0.000 26.167
Tenure (years) 6.276 6.022 0.000 26.083
Training (EPT) in current job 0.471 0.499 0.000 1.000
Married/with partner 0.589 0.492 0.000 1.000
Occupation
Professional 0.067 0.249 0.000 1.000
Intermediate 0.297 0.457 0.000 1.000
Skilled non manual 0.130 0.336 0.000 1.000
Skilled manual 0.296 0.456 0.000 1.000
Semi-skilled 0.104 0.305 0.000 1.000
Unskilled 0.021 0.142 0.000 1.000
Firm size
1-10 emp 0.138 0.344 0.000 1.000
11-24 emp 0.129 0.335 0.000 1.000
25-99 emp 0.231 0.421 0.000 1.000
100-499 emp 0.229 0.420 0.000 1.000
500+ emp 0.198 0.399 0.000 1.000
Year dummies
Year 1981 0.259 0.438 0.000 1.000
Year 1991 0.223 0.416 0.000 1.000
Year 1996 0.128 0.334 0.000 1.000
Year 2000 0.390 0.488 0.000 1.000
NOTE: Total of 14762 person-year observations, corresponding to 8163 diﬀerent individuals. Sample restricted
to individuals whose main occupation is paid work, with a gross hourly wage ranging between 50 pence and
100 pounds. Further restrictions involve valid work history information (less than six months missing from 16th
birthday to interview date) and ability test completion at 10 (BCS) or 11 (NCDS).
objective then is to minimise the aggregate error
∑
k∈K e
′
kek = trace(X
′[I − g1g′1]X) subject to
the normalisation constraint.
Since the objective is to retrieve the optimal a1, it is now necessary to substitute into the
objective function in order to derive g1. The problem becomes:
min{a1,λ}trace(X
′X)− trace(X ′Xa1a′1X ′X)− λ(1−Xa1a′1X ′),
where the ﬁrst term can be ignored. This problem can be re-written as:
max{a1,λ}a
′
1(X
′X)(X ′X)a1 + λ(1− a′1X ′Xa1),
which leads to the ﬁrst order condition:
(X ′X)a1 = λa1.
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This is basically the deﬁnition of a1 as the characteristic vector of matrix X ′X. If values in
the score matrix X have been previously standardised, X ′X is simply the correlation matrix.
Changes of origin and scale in our problem are necessary in order to make data comparable
across cohorts. The second order condition is immediately satisﬁed because X ′X is a positive
deﬁnite matrix.
Now the problem is to ascertain which is the sought-after characteristic vector. Standard
results from matrix algebra show that the number of possible eigenvectors is identical to the
rank of matrix X ′X. This will coincide with the number of tests administered if there is no
perfect collinearity. To solve this, notice that after substitution from the f.o.c., the objective
that needs to be minimised is given by:
a′1(X
′X)(X ′X)a1 = a′1λ
2a1 = λ2.
Then the highest eigenvalue associated with the correlation matrix will determine the appro-
priate characteristic vector. The remaining K − 1 principal components can be easily calculated
using the remaining eigenvalues and imposing that g′mgn = 0, for all m = n, i.e. they must be
mutually orthogonal.
The principal components methodology appears to be a natural approach in order to use for
deriving an index of cognitive ability for each survey.
Two main problems aﬀect the derivation of an ability index in this cohort data. On the one
hand, the tests used for each diﬀerent cohort are not identical, although there is some overlapping
on the attributes they intend to measure, such as maths and reading. On the other hand, there
is the issue of whether an ability index can encompass all the information contained in a series
of diﬀerent test scores.
To minimise these problems, I followed a series of steps. I ﬁrst removed within-cohort vari-
ation purely due to the fact that children have been tested in diﬀerent months.38 Deriving
residuals from a regression of each test score variable on time was meant to put respondents’
scores on a same level of comparison.39 Using the residualised scores, the full set of principal
components is calculated for each cohort.
The principal component extraction results are summarised in table 9.
Diﬀerences between the batteries of tests administered in NCDS and BCS may imply that g
might mean diﬀerent things for each cohort. In fact, there are more tests available for NCDS,
which has an eﬀect on the proportion of the observed total variation explained by the ﬁrst princi-
pal component. Copying designs is frequently described as less correlated with cognitive ability,
begin associated with more primary-type of abilities, such as visual and motor co-ordination. I
have checked how robust g is to the exclusion of this test from the battery, and I have further
experimented by aggregating verbal and non-verbal ability into a single value by adding them
38Those tested earlier have on average lower scores because their cognitive capacities are less developed than
their peers interviewed months later.
39For example, all BCS respondents around the age of ten interviewed in diﬀerent months become comparable
this way.
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Table 9: Principal component derivation of g
Pcpal Eigenvalue Standard Cumulative Original variables Eigenvector
Compt. Deviation variance (1st comp.)
NCDS-Age 11
1 3.4256 1.85 0.69 Copying designs 0.26
2 0.8252 0.91 0.85 Verbal ability 0.50
3 0.3549 0.59 0.92 Non verbal ability 0.48
4 0.2280 0.47 0.96 Maths ability 0.49
5 0.1663 0.40 1.00 Reading ability 0.46
BCS-Age 10
1 2.4784 1.57 0.82 Maths test 0.57
2 0.2668 0.51 0.91 Reading 0.58
3 0.2547 0.50 1.00 British Ability Scale 0.58
NOTE: Principal components calculated from age-residualised test scores, within every age-cohort group. Last
two columns represent each test’s association with the ﬁrst principal component.
up.
Table 10: Alternative factor decompositions: NCDS11
g(4): Four scores only.
Factor order Contr.to var. Variable g(4) loadings
g(4)= 1 0.811 Verbal ab. 0.51
2 0.089 Non-verbal ab. 0.49
3 0.057 Maths 0.50
4 0.042 Reading 0.48
g(3): Three scores only.
Factor order Contr.to var. Variable g(3) loadings
g(3)= 1 0.844 Ver+non ver.ab. 0.58
2 0.091 Maths 0.58
3 0.064 Reading 0.56
Correlation matrix of alternative g’s
g(3) g(4) g(5)
g(3) 1
g(4) 0.9951 1
g(5) 0.9862 0.9913 1
NOTE: Principal component analysis of reduced sets of ability scores in NCDS11. Proportion of variance explained
= λi/
∑
j λj , where λj is the j
th eigenvalue. Factor loadings proceed from eigenvector associated to ﬁrst eigenvalue
in each decomposition. The correlation matrix presents correlations between g(3), g(4) and the ﬁrst principal
component using the ﬁve variables1.
Table 10 analyses changes in the derived g. It suggests that measured g is quite robust
to these alternative speciﬁcations. Additionally, it must be noticed that with a three scores
speciﬁcation, BCS and NCDS are far more comparable in terms of (a) Number of scores used,
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(b) Correlation between g and the original scores, (c) Proportion of total variation explained.
I have also checked whether the ability distributions in BCS and NCDS are signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent from each other. Kernel density estimates in ﬁgure 1 basically overlap with each other,
indicating they’re almost identical.
Figure 1: Ability indexes at age 11/10
Ability index: g
 Density of g: 1970 cohort  Density of g: 1958 cohort, all 
 Density of g: 1958 cohort, 4 te  Density of g: 1958 cohort, 3 te
−3.38325 2.65544
0
.36317
NOTE: Kernel density estimates of cognitive ability index distribution for BCS and NCDS
(under three alternative speciﬁcations speciﬁed in table 10).
About whether it is valid to collapse all ability scores into a single index, there is an eﬃ-
ciency/unbiasedness trade-oﬀ. Because separate scores are so much correlated with each other,
it is highly plausible that there is an underlying commonality to all of them, as suggested by the
high proportion of variance explained by g in BCS and NCDS (three scores), above 80 percent,
which is much higher than the 33 percent that would be implied by completely independent
variables. Multi-collinearity at this scale may well remove all evidence from employer learning.
Measurement error of g is also likely to attenuate ability-related estimates. In any case, this is
a better approach than relying on maths scores which are not directly comparable either.40. In
terms of explained wages, excluded components play a much minor role compared to g in both
cohorts, particularly for BCS. Thus, this construct of g appears to be most suitable measure of
cognitive ability that can be used from the available data.
40For example, emphasis on arithmetics is not identical, etc...
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B.3 Controlling for diﬀerential sample selection
As noted, it is important to control for the selective composition of the samples suitable for
estimation. One possible approach is to model the process that determines whether an individual
enters the valid estimation sample in a given year using background childhood and family data
for the earlier sweeps. If this process is adequately controlled for, it will be possible to obtain
unbiased estimates of the earnings process that are relevant for the learning model.
Table 11: Determinants of participation in estimation panel
NCDS-23 NCDS-33 NCDS-42 BCS-21 BCS-26 BCS-30
Ability index .059 .140 .118 -.021 .215 .151
(.028) (.029) (.029) (.031) (.019) (.018)
Ability i. squared -.063 -.049 -.037 -.109 -.037 -.015
(.013) (.014) (.014) (.023) (.014) (.013)
Lies at school -.211 -.249 -.256 -.057 -.089 -.062
(.052) (.055) (.055) (.057) (.039) (.032)
Father’s Social Class
Professional -.044 .191 .111 -.268 .276 .276
(.101) (.103) (.103) (.178) (.117) (.113)
Intermediate .061 .229 .114 -.149 .243 .172
(.066) (.067) (.067) (.123) (.084) (.080)
Skilled non-manual .157 .245 .067 -.165 .291 .324
(.076) (.076) (.067) (.134) (.091) (.087)
Skilled manual .124 .184 .136 -.065 .209 .178
(.052) (.054) (.054) (.101) (.072) (.067)
Semi-Skilled manual .400 .282 .231 -.059 .070 .087
(.163) (.160) (.160) (.118) (.086) (.080)
Unskilled .163 .259 .198 -.370 -.203 -.021
(.068) (.069) (.069) (.181) (.120) (.105)
Pseudo-R2 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.02 0.04 0.02
Log-likelihood -4797.3 -4625.3 -4594.2 -1351.9 -3523.9 -3941.7
Observations NCDS: 7230 BCS: 5815
Proportion 52.95 40.40 39.07 6.38 32.50 50.59
NOTE: Dependent variables equals one if individual is present in each adult survey and ,
given childhood information is available. Other controls include region at birth, parent’s
education level and school type. Reference father’s social class group is father not work-
ing/missing. Probit coeﬃcients reported. Standard errors displayed within parentheses.
Consider the probability that an individual i from cohort c participates in survey j as a
function of a vector of characteristics ei,c such as Φ[λjei,c]. According to the symmetric learning
model, the expected log wage of this individual in survey j conditional on being part of that
survey and providing valid data is determined by:
E[wi,c,j |xij , si, zi, present] = γj + µjxij + α0jsi + α1xijsi + β0jzi + β1zixij + E[ξij |present],
where E[ξij |present] = σj φ[λjei,c]Φ[λjei,c] under the assumption that Φ[·] corresponds to the standard
normal distribution cumulative function and σ is the covariance between the random component
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of participation and the heterogeneity term in the wage equation ξij . Thus, in order to account
for unobservable determinants of participation that might be correlated with the wage process,
I include additional terms consisting of the estimated selection term, known as the ‘Mills Ratio’
φ[λjei,c]
Φ[λjei,c]
. In order to instrument participation, I include a wide range of background variables
which proved not to be signiﬁcant if included in the main wage equation but proved signiﬁcant
in their prediction of participation in the survey. These include a quadratic in the ability index,
parental class and education information and whether the teacher had reported that the indi-
vidual, as a child, used to lie at school. Controlling for ability, the assumption of conditional
independence required is more likely to be satisﬁed in practice than in a data set with more
limited information. Table 11 displays the coeﬃcients of key variables in the selection equation,
suggesting a suﬃcient degree of correlation of the excluded variables with the participation out-
come. It is interesting to see that adult attrition is not monotonic in ability, with individuals at
the extremes of the distribution less likely to be part of the ﬁnal estimation sample. Anticipating
some of the wage results, the selection term turns out to be not statistically signiﬁcant in either
of the wage equations estimated in this chapter.
B.4 Returns to ability and schooling over the lifetime
Variation in potential experience amongst identically educated individuals is mostly driven by
age diﬀerences. It is therefore interesting to investigate how returns to ability and education
vary over the lifetime. I carry out a graphical interpolation exercise that can be considered as a
less restrictive imposition on the data than an arbitrary functional form. Figure 2 displays the
point estimates of returns to g reported on its left-hand-side. Returns estimates for the same
cohort are joined with a straight line. The ﬁgure on the right hand side documents the estimated
returns to years of full time education after the age of compulsory schooling.
The severity of the missing data problem cannot be denied. There is no common age support
for age values higher than 30 and younger than 23. Having only two cohorts, time eﬀects are
restricted to twelve-year long intervals (the diﬀerence in birth dates for both cohorts) that must
refer to relatively young workers (ages 23 to 30). However, there are important features that
emerge from such limited data, such as a clear life-cycle pattern of increasing returns to ability
(over the set of observed age values) which is common to both cohorts.
The left part of ﬁgure 2 shows that the ﬁtted ability returns/age proﬁle for the later 1970
cohort always exceeds that for the 1958 NCDS cohort. I discuss the two speciﬁcations separately.
Firstly, without qualiﬁcation controls, the gap is marginally wider when the cohorts are in their
early twenties, which corresponds to a comparison of the early 1980s with the early 1990s.
According to the literature, this is the period when returns to education grew faster (Gosling
et al (2000)). Thus, in order to make inferences about changes in this period one must rely on
two relatively young cohorts, when returns to both education and ability are at their lowest.
The gap in ability returns between the cohorts actually becomes smaller as age grows and the
time comparison must refer to the late nineties versus the late eighties. This coincides with the
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Figure 2: Returns to cognitive ability and years of education over lifetime: By
cohort
Returns to cognitive ability
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NOTE: Returns to measure of cognitive ability displayed by cohort and two speciﬁcations: (1)
Including parental social class and education controls. (2) As in (1), including detailed individual
qualiﬁcations. Returns to years of post compulsory (after 16) full time education displayed by
cohort and two speciﬁcations. (1) With parental controls. (2) As in (1), including measures of
cognitive and non-cognitive ability. All returns are based on OLS regressions of log hourly wages
for working males in each survey.
deceleration in the upward trend in returns to education which was reported during the nineties.
After controlling for education, the gap in ability returns between the cohorts increases
monotonically and the returns can be well ﬁtted with a straight line. Cognitive ability is in-
creasingly rewarded in the labour market as an individual grows older, and this pattern has
become marginally stronger in the 1970 cohort.
I also display estimated returns to schooling by cohort under alternative speciﬁcations (right
hand side). With and without ability measures, returns to schooling appear to increase at least
until individuals are in their mid-thirties. For very young individuals, returns to education are
not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero because more educated individuals have only just joined the
labour market and are compared to more experienced workers. Neglecting ability data leads to
higher estimates of the returns to education. No signiﬁcant diﬀerences over time can be found
between cohorts for either speciﬁcation (with and without ability controls).
In terms of the symmetric learning model, the implication from these ﬁgures is that β1
is unambiguously positive, suggesting the existence of employer learning. However, α1 is also
positive although its appears to become zero after the early thirties for the NCDS cohort.
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